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Executive Summary 
 
As the regulatory need for electric utilities to reduce their CO2 emissions increases, 
energy-efficiency (EE) programs will be a cost-effective alternative to consider in 
obtaining this goal. Additionally, since the enactment of Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA), Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) goals will be harder 
for utilities to meet. Determining whether incentives, regulations, or both in combination 
are most successful at innovating and implementing energy-saving technology is crucial 
to energy policy and demand side management (DSM). Understanding incentives that 
motivate installation of energy efficient equipment and creating regulations that spur 
innovations rather than animosity or negative externalities will lead to successful policy 
outcome. To achieve optimum EE, three federal lighting policies and original survey 
responses from DSM participants are analyzed.  
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1. Introduction: EE 
 
Since the 1970s, energy efficiency (EE) has been a method to reduce energy consumption 
and damage to the environment. EE resurges as a popular topic with policy makers, 
environmental organizations, and the general public whenever energy prices increase. 
Power utilities, government organizations regulating utilities, and organizations 
concerned about the environment consider EE a resource capable of yielding energy and 
demand savings that can displace electricity generation from coal, natural gas, nuclear 
power, wind power, and other supply-side resources (ACEEE, 2014). 
 
Now there is national motivation to evaluate the potential of EE programs. On June 2, 
2014, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced details of the Clean Power 
Plan (also known as 111D), a proposal to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 
existing stationary sources, mainly from electric power plants (EPA, 2014). With this 
initiative EE will take on additional significance. In the Clean Power Plan, the EPA 
proposes a plan that is “flexible—reflecting that different states have a different mix of 
sources and opportunities” (EPA, 2014). Most energy saving technologies are available 
to the entire U.S. market. Therefore, EE will be viewed as a widely available source and 
opportunity to reduce CO2 emissions. 
 
Nationally, EE has taken hold as a cost-effective practice to reduce energy costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Twenty-five states have adopted the Energy Efficiency 
Resource Standard (EERS) through regulation or legislation (ACEEE, 2014). EERS 
requires utilities to achieve a predetermined percentage reduction in energy sales from 
energy efficiency measures. Often these measures are tracked through utility EE 
incentive programs, also known as demand-side management (DSM), which verifies if 
the utility has achieved the energy savings target.  
 
With only half of U.S. states adopting EERS, much more could be done to reduce energy 
consumption. Energy efficiency implementation and energy savings vary greatly between 
states, even those with EERS. The Rocky Mountain Institute estimates that if 40 of the 
6 
 
lowest performing states achieved the energy efficiency per capita of the top 10 states, 
1.2 million gigawatt-hours (GWh) would be saved annually. The potential savings equate 
to 30 percent of the nation’s annual electricity use (Mim et al., 2009). This EE disparity 
highlights the savings still possible from EE measures. 
 
2. Creating EE: Regulation, Incentive, or Both? 
 
Federal regulations are critical to perpetuate EE improvements and maintain standards on 
a national level. Several regulations and policies enacted over the last decade impact 
technology efficiency minimums. These regulations set the floor, or the lowest efficiency 
allowed. These minimums dictate which technologies are available for consumers to 
purchase by making an existing technology obsolete or illegal, although there is little 
enforcement and many of the illegal products remain on the market (Alliance to Save 
Energy, 2011; Nadel, 2011; Sheppard, 2014). These regulations also negatively impact 
the performance and claimed energy savings from utility EE programs. Regulations that 
affect technology availability or remove products from the market reduce utilities’ ability 
to offer EE incentives. Often incentives are not available when replacing obsolete 
technology with more efficient technology because the energy savings are no longer 
allowed to be claimed as savings by the utility. In other words, the “stick” of regulation 
takes away the “carrot” that utilities could offer customers. 
 
When regulations determine when and why something is no longer available for 
purchase, consumers are often misled or don’t understand why changes took place. This 
confusion became evident when the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) 
regulations affected consumer lighting choices. Years after EISA was approved by our 
federal policy makers, the EE standards set by EISA were phased into the lighting 
market. These changes perpetuated political grandstanding, even by those who voted for 
the bill, and media sensationalism of regulations banning consumer choices. Unhappy 
consumers now look to creative solutions or points of purchase to avoid changing a 
preferred light source or making forced investments into EE lighting. Additionally, 
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economists argue regulations are wasteful, expensive, and inefficient at obtaining the EE 
objectives (Graetz, 2012), leaving some to question the intent and benefit of regulations. 
 
Incentives are often offered to encourage adoption of EE technology. Incentives can take 
many forms (e.g., tax credits/deductions, cash rebates, financing) and are available from 
many sources (e.g., federal, state, local utilities). Arguments have been made that 
economic incentives are decidedly more effective than regulations in encouraging the 
cost-effective adoption and diffusion of relevant new technologies (Jaffe et al., 2004). 
Finding “flexible policy instruments, based on economic incentives rather than 
mandatory compliance methods, are more likely to encourage the development and 
implementation of cost-effective technology” (Jaffe et al., 2004).  Use of incentives to 
encourage implementation of EE technology has proven to be effective (Anderson & 
Newell, 2004; Gillingham et al., 2006; Howard, 2007; Metcalf, 2007), but incentives also 
face their fair share of critics. Studies and papers have been published raising concerns of 
free-riding, equity, and measurement verification of EE incentive programs (Wirl, 2000; 
Loughran & Kulick, 2004; Graetz, 2012; Jacoby-Hawkins, 2014), all of which raise 
doubts to the effectiveness of incentives in obtaining energy savings. Since both the 
carrot and the stick have flaws, a debate ensues over which is more effective in EE 
policy.  
 
While regulations and incentives are far from perfect, this paper looks to dispel the 
arguments that either is unnecessary in EE. Instead, I prove there is a partnership that 
makes the other more effective in policy and energy savings. First, this partnership is 
shown through an analysis of successes and failures of three prominent federal lighting 
policies. Second, an ex ante survey is conducted on participants in a lighting rebate 
incentive program. The analysis illustrates federal regulations can cause end-user 
confusion and resentment, but can also spur industry innovation and technological 
advancement. EISA is a shining example of both sides of regulation. Policies that include 
incentivizing innovation and technology often lead to higher EE standards, although 
incentivizing private business is often overlooked as a policy option. Additionally, 
consumer incentives spur adoption and reduce resentment of regulation. Offering the 
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correct amount and form of incentive is needed on two fronts: private sector industry to 
catalyze EE innovation and the consumer to encourage EE implementation, technology 
acceptance, and broad dispersion.  
 
For policy makers and DSM facilitators, understanding the impact of regulations and 
incentives, and capitalizing on their relationship, is crucial. A partnership between 
regulations and incentives could increase the potential of EE programs and technology. It 
is also important to recognize that a regulation, such as EISA, that bans a technology also 
impacts the ability to offer incentives. Incentives can be reduced or unavailable when 
replacing a banned technology with more efficient technology. This particularly impacts 
utilities in energy savings they claim and report to state EERS. The survey conducted for 
this paper addresses barriers to EE and how to increase participation rates in DSM 
programs in the post-EISA era. 
 
Figure 1 
3. Lighting Background 
 
This paper will focus on non-residential lighting uses. In 2012, commercial buildings 
consumed approximately 274 billion kWh of electricity in lighting alone, comprising 21 
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percent of the total energy used in the commercial sector (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration [EIA], 2014). According to the EIA, the largest electric energy consumer 
is non-residential buildings. In 2011, residential buildings consumed over 21 quintillion 
BTUs of energy (EIA, 2014). Manufacturing facilities, commercial, and industrial 
buildings consumed over 69 quintillion BTUs of energy (EIA, 2014). With three times 
the energy usage, it makes sense to prioritize the energy reduction of non-residential 
buildings.  
 
Lighting technology itself has made significant improvements in efficiency. Lighting 
efficiency is measured in lumens per watt (LPW). LPW denotes the amount of light 
generated per watt of energy consumed by the lighting system. The higher the lumens per 
watt, the less energy you need to light up a space. Figure 2 graphs the improvements in 
efficiency of 4-foot linear fluorescent lamps. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Lighting has also led the way as the most cost-effective EE measure, becoming a heavily 
utilized EE incentive program. A study by Joseph Eto reveals that majority of EE 
programs offered by utilities are “multi-measure programs” followed closely by “lighting 
only programs” (Eto et al., 2000). Multi-measure programs offer EE incentives on a mix 
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of measures such as light, heating/cooling, refrigeration, motors, and/or building 
envelope. In these multi-measure programs, lighting accounted for majority of the 
savings compared to the other categories (Eto et al., 2000). As a total, lighting EE 
accounted for over 60 percent of the energy savings (Eto et al., 2000). 
 
4. Federal Lighting Regulations, Policies, & Innovation Incentives  
 
Understanding federal lighting policy impact and ability to achieve energy savings is 
important. Some policies have much greater impact on energy savings than others. 
Additionally, federal regulations, whether intended or not, have negatively impacted 
many electric utilities’ “claimed” energy savings. Claimed energy savings is used to meet 
state-mandated EERS. 
 
4.1 Timeline & Rubric for Policy 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, efficiency regulations made their first impacts on lighting. 
In the 25 years that have passed, federal policy has influenced lighting from research and 
development (R&D) to end user. The efficiency regulation from federal lighting policy 
has been instrumental in achieving energy savings and critical to setting efficiency 
minimums for lighting manufacturers to meet. Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) 
created the first lighting efficiency regulations, becoming the blueprint for future lighting 
regulatory policies. Over 10 years later, EPAct 2005 created incentives for energy 
efficient lighting but did not regulate lighting products. The biggest regulatory game 
changer is EISA 2007, which significantly transformed lighting and the lighting industry. 
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Figure 3 
 
The following rubric is used to measure lighting policy success in achieving energy 
savings and transformation in the industry. Four of the points below—effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, fairness/equity, and clarity of policy—are generally important to judging a 
policy’s success (Bardach, 2012; Smith, 2012). For purposes of this paper, ability to 
stimulate innovation has been included in the policy rubric. 
 
 
Considerations in 
EE Policy Analysis 
 
 Effectiveness: Is the policy creating energy savings? 
 Cost-Effectiveness: Is this cost-effective for the government, utility, manufacturer, and 
consumer?  
 Fairness/Equity: Is the policy accessible and fair to the public?  
 Clarity of Policy: Are the regulations and incentives clear? 
 Ability to Stimulate Innovation: Will the policy lead to EE breakthroughs or improvements 
to existing technology? 
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4.2 Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) 
 
In 1992, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act into law. This bill contains two 
points of interest for this paper: lighting-efficiency standards and prioritizing 
conservation as the preferred method of electric resource planning (Wirl, 2000). A small 
portion of EPAct 1992 was directed toward lighting (most would remember it for 
deregulating the electric utility industry), but that small portion made a very large impact 
in the lighting industry. EPAct 1992 set the first lighting efficiency standards, making 
nonqualified products illegal to manufacture or import. The lighting industry was widely 
impacted, and many of the most commonly used lamps failed to meet the new standards. 
By mid-1994, T12 4-foot and 8-foot “full-wattage lamps” (40w, 75w, 110w) were 
eliminated from manufacturing, replaced by more energy efficient T12 4-foot and 8-foot 
lamps with lower wattage (34w, 60w, 95w). By the end of 1995, incandescent reflector 
(commonly known as a flood light) and PAR lamps that did not meet the minimum LPW 
were also banned from manufacture (Osram Sylvania Lighting, 1994).  
 
The literature from lighting manufacturers regarding EPAct 1992 states there are two 
ways to persuade consumers to install energy efficient lighting: elimination of product 
through legislation and education, paired often with utility incentives (Osram Sylvania 
Lighting, 1994). Additionally, there is firm belief that people will switch to more efficient 
lighting because it saves money. Two decades later, those siloed methods and 
justifications are still similar. EPAct 1992 contained many light bulb and lamp 
‘exemptions’ to the regulations, but manufacturers did not spend time looking for 
loopholes. Instead they were looking ahead to 2005, the next Energy Policy Act. 
Acknowledging that “if anything, performance standards will be made stricter and 
exemptions will be eliminated...the best strategy is to pursue the intent of the legislations 
and make an investment in the most energy efficient technologies available” (Osram 
Sylvania Lighting, 1994). 
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EPAct 1992 was equitable; it covered 
the majority of lighting technology 
and was applied to all consumers. 
But considering the quality of 
replacement equipment, it is 
surprising the legislation was so 
successful. Much of the EE 
technology at the time would be considered sub-par or unsuitable replacement by today’s 
standards. The CFLs available in the 1990s were not as warm (Kelvin color) as 
incandescent lamps, were low on the color rendering index (CRI), had slow start-up time, 
were not dimmable, and were offered in a small and often inconvenient selection of bulb 
shapes. EPAct 1992 did not include incentives or support lighting R&D to encourage 
technology advancement.  
 
Allowing lower wattage T12s to stay in circulation was a cost-effective measure. To 
comply, T12 users only had to replace lamps as needed, not the ballast. An intelligent 
move, as the more efficient T8 lighting was new to market and was earning a bad 
reputation for high failure rates and product issues.  
 
4.3 Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) 
 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), designed by the Bush administration and 
signed into practice in August 2005, was the first major energy policy since EPAct 1992. 
Out of $14B available in tax incentives (projected accumulative from 2005 to 2015), 2.5 
percent ($340M) was dedicated to incentivizing EE improvements in residential and 
commercial buildings (Metcalf, 2007). The majority of incentives went to energy 
producers, such as the oil industry and electric utilities, and contained few regulations 
(including no lighting efficiency regulations). Instead the act looked to incentivize 
businesses to implement energy efficient equipment in 2006 and 2007 through an 
accelerated tax deduction for commercial buildings. 
 
Early 1990s Lighting Technology  
  CFLs Incandescent 
Average Kelvin Color 4000K 2700K  
Dimmability No Yes 
CRI (scale of 0-100) Mid 70s 90+ 
Start-Up Time 10+ seconds Instant 
Initial Investment High Low 
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In “Commercial Building Tax Deduction,” government officials looked to the IRS to 
define rules for the tax deduction. The IRS looked to the lighting industry, lighting 
professionals, and civil engineers to define energy efficient lighting. Adding to the 
confusion, the government officials determining the EE standard (Secretary of the 
Treasury) did not have the technical background to determine what the EE qualifications 
should be. Initially there was an interim rule until the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
conjunction with the Secretary of Energy, made a determination. Eventually, the rule 
stated that lighting power density (LPD) 25 to 40 percent lower than the minimum 
ASHRAE standard would qualify for the tax deduction, with warehouse spaces needing 
to be over 50 percent lower (DiLouie, 2005). 
 
Eighteen months later, EPAct 2005 parameters were slightly more defined to 
“commercial building property that is certified to reduce total annual energy and power 
costs to at least 50% less than a building satisfying the [ASHRAE/IES] 90.1-2001 
Standard” (U.S. Government - EPAct, 2005). This measurement involves calculating 
LPD by either building area or space-by-space and ensuring LPW is less than the 
required standard. Picking the method to qualify is selected by the lighting provider, 
leaving the calculation open for manipulation. Also, bi-level switching or controls of 
lighting were mandated for most buildings. To add to the confusion, some states had 
adopted standards stricter than ASHRAE 2001, leaving some projects to qualify for a tax 
incentive but not meet the local energy code.  
 
Ambiguity in the policy was taken advantage of. For example, one contractor 
misleadingly made an argument that “bi-level” controls could mean turning one side of a 
large room on and leave the other half off. The intent of the policy was to allow 
occupants a minimum choice of off, 50 percent, or 100 percent uniform light level of the 
entire space. This improved design allows occupants control of light levels and potential 
energy savings when at the 50 percent level. Offering “control” increases the material and 
installation costs, which the contractor was subversively looking to avoid. This example 
highlights EPAct 2005’s intent to properly incentivize energy efficient design, but the 
lack of stipulations increases opportunities for manipulation. Also of concern, the IRS did 
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not conduct inspections to verify equipment and ambiguity remained on what constituted 
“certified proof” of energy savings. 
 
The shortcomings of EPAct 2005 highlight the need for clarity, education, and equity in 
policies that offer incentives, as well as the importance of reviewing whether a policy has 
successfully achieved its intended goal (Friedrich, 2009; Geller, 2006; Gillingham et al., 
2006, 2009; Nadel, 2006). This policy lacked direction and qualifying rules for 18 of the 
initial 24 months it was intended to exist. Those parties directed to establish guidelines 
and implementation of the incentives did not have the technical background to do so. 
Unclear policies and ambiguous qualifying standards allowed for manipulation and 
outright deception to obtain the tax incentives. On the other hand, those who wanted to 
play by the rules couldn’t be certain they met the objectives. Many tax accountants were 
unsure if the qualifications for the accelerated deduction were met and were unsure how 
to apply them. There is also the concern of equity in this policy. The resources needed to 
take advantage of EPAct 2005’s tax deductions are extensive. Most businesses would 
need to be of significant size to justify the dollars-per-square-foot return on the financial 
and time investment. In addition to the lighting equipment costs, most businesses would 
need to hire a certified lighting consultant or engineer, building engineer, and tax 
accountant in order to take advantage of the incentive. These barriers prevent or 
discourage many small and medium-size businesses from participating.  
 
There is a small section in EPAct 2005 that became significant two years later in EISA 
2007: Section 1008, “Prizes for Achievement in Grand Challenges of Science and 
Technology.” In this section, the DOE was permitted to carry out contests with $5M and 
$10M cash prizes to recognize breakthrough achievements in R&D that were 
demonstrated and made available for commercial applications.  
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4.4 Energy Independence and Security Act 2007 (EISA 2007) 
 
Introduced in 2007 by the U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 6, the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) passed both legislative branches, and signed into 
law on December 19, 2007 by President George W. Bush. The goal of this legislation: 
 
“A bill to move the United States toward greater energy independence and 
security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to protect 
consumers, to increase the efficiency of products, buildings and vehicles, 
to promote research on and deploy greenhouse gas capture and storage 
options, and to improve the energy performance of the federal 
government, and for other purposes” (H.R. 6 – 110th Congress, 2007). 
 
Four sections: 321, 322, 324, and 655, of the 267 Sections in EISA impact the lighting 
industry. 
 
EISA’s most immediate impact to the lighting industry is a labeling requirement for 
lamps and setting a minimum operating life and EE standard, phased in gradually over 3 
years. With these regulations, 40w, 60w, 75w, and 100w incandescent lamps would be 
considered inefficient and no longer manufactured in or imported to the U.S. Generally 
EISA required incandescent lamps to be 25 percent more energy efficient, effectively 
removing “general use” filament lamps from the market. Though there are many 
exceptions for “specialty bulbs” such as high spectrum lights, grow lights, shatter proof, 
and three-way bulbs.  
 
For linear fluorescent lamps (2’ U bend, 4’, and 8’) EISA raised the minimum CRI 
allowed under the LPW exception. 
Previously established in EPAct 
1992, the CRI increased from 82 
CRI to 87 CRI. While EISA did not 
spell out a LPW efficiency 
Pre-EISA 
Wattage 
Maximum Wattage 
Allowed Under EISA Effective Date 
100 watt ≤ 72 watts January 1, 2012 
75 watt ≤ 53 watts January 1, 2013 
60 watt ≤ 43 watts January 1, 2014 
40 watt ≤ 29 watts January 1, 2014 
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increase, it did direct the DOE to review and revised all linear fluorescent lamps (T12, 
T8, and T5). With the change of LPW and CRI requirements established in EISA, all 
‘non-specially’ T12 fluorescent lamps and many low CRI T8 fluorescent lamps would 
not meet the efficiency standards. The DOE was also direct to review and revise reflector 
and PAR lamps. EISA’s creators provide stipulations for future revisions to the LPW 
standard. This was two-fold, to ensure goals are reachable and to increase EE standards 
as technology improves and becomes market ready. 
 
Figure 4 
In 2009, eighteen months after EISA directed the DOE to revise minimum lamp 
efficiency standards, the DOE announced its rulemaking. Effective July 14, 2012, the 
LPW revision would essentially make all ‘general use’ T12 linear fluorescent lamps 
obsolete. Additionally, many reflector lamps would be no longer meet efficiency 
minimums. Further into the future (July 14, 2014), the DOE mandated certain T8 bulbs, 
which were considered efficient at the time, would no longer meet the LPW requirement. 
As of Fall 2014, the DOE is considering increasing the minimum LPW standard for 
linear fluorescent and reflector lamps. This review and rulemaking potential is at the very 
earliest of the 3-year period (2014 through 2017) specified by EISA.   
18 
 
 
EISA standards (shaded fill), DOE Rulemaking (no fill)     Figure 5 
 
Between EISA and DOE’s 2009 rulemaking, majority of light sources used by the public 
would be affected by new LPW regulations. Meaning consumers would either need to 
purchase new lighting fragmentarily (as their existing inefficient systems stopped 
working) or consider making a significant investment (replacing all of their existing 
lighting with more energy efficient product). Either way, the regulations would 
accomplish removing inefficient lighting from the market.  
 
Both EISA and DOE’s 2009 rulemaking relied heavily on technological advancements in 
lighting. Solid state lighting, or the better known acronym LEDs (light emitting diodes), 
were created in the 1960s and mainly used in electronic components, not as a light 
source. In 2007, consumer available LEDs averaged 30 LPW and mainly available in 
colors, not while light (US DOE, 2013). Another issue was cost-effectiveness. There was 
the potential to create ‘white light’ by combining red, green, and blue (RGB) LEDs, but 
the cost and packaging size would make consumer applications impossible. R&D of LED 
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chips were making strides. In 2005 a white LED chip with 70 LPW was created and in 
2009 100 LPW white LED chip (CREE, 2010). Though it is important to note this is a 
laboratory setting and the chip wasn’t “in” a bulb or fixture. This diode is just one piece 
of a complicated LED lamp. Without significant technological advancement and/or 
innovation in lighting products, particularly LEDs, efficiency goals would be nearly 
impossible to meet. 
 
To help advance LED innovation and incentivize the lighting industry, a ‘carrot’ was 
offered among the ‘sticks’ in EISA. Section 655 mandated the ‘Bright Tomorrow 
Lighting Prize’, known in the lighting industry as: The L Prize. 
 
This section establishes cash prizes* and federal government purchase contracts of the 
winning products:  
 $10 million is authorized for a 60-watt incandescent replacement LED product 
 $5 million for a PAR38 halogen replacement LED product 
 $5 million for a 21st Century Lamp 
*(These amounts were determined under EPAct 2005, Section 1008 ‘Prizes for Achievement in Grand Challenges of 
Science and Technology’.) 
 
Definitions for product entry specifications include: shape of lamp, efficiency, CRI, 
minimum life of lamp, and light distribution from the lamp. Also, mass production of 
product must be possible. The DOE is charged with designing the technical review of the 
product. Details on the L Prize follow this section. 
 
Out of all lighting policies, EISA has made the greatest impact. Incandescent lamps were 
essentially removed from the market. The DOE was charged to review, revise, and 
mandate EE standards in all general use lighting. In addition to designing and facilitating 
successful innovations contests. The market dispersion of LEDs and feasibility of 
meeting EISA’s EE regulations would be contingent on a successful Bright Tomorrow 
Lighting Prizes campaign.  Manufacturers had to confront two issues: discontinuing the 
manufacturing of the deemed “inefficient” bulbs and innovating product to meet the new 
efficiency standards.  
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Often overlooked in this process, utilities had significant changes to rebate incentives and 
energy savings goals to consider. First, they would have to analyze new lighting products, 
deciding if and how much rebate incentive to offer for these products. Second, with EISA 
and DOE rulemaking removing T12s, certain flood lights, and incandescent lamps from 
the market, utilities would have a difficult time offering rebate incentive to customers 
who have these products. Rebates are intended to incentivizes installation of more 
efficient products, not reduce the cost a replacement system that meets the new minimum 
standard. This also decreases utility’s ‘reported savings’ for EE programs. For example, 
EISA perpetuated the adoption of new EE baselines for Xcel Energy and alternative CIP 
lighting rebate programs (Xcel Energy, 2103). In complying with these changes actual 
energy savings could be higher than reported savings, for instance a 100w incandescent 
would be rated as a 72w existing wattage, highest allowable wattage replacement lamp in 
the market (See EISA Incandescent Chart for reference). 
 
For example, a 17w LED replaces a 
100w incandescent, the reported savings 
to State EE programs would be 55w, not 
83w. This significantly changes the 
amount of reported energy saved, which 
should be considered in future year-to-
year comparisons. Particularly any 
programs after 2012, the last year 
production of T12 and 60w incandescent 
lamps are allowed.   
 
Some politicians have expressed interest in undoing EISA standards enacted on freedom 
of choice or claiming the policy hurts lighting manufacturers (Nadel, 2011; Sheppard, 
2014). The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and leading lighting 
manufacturers have unanimously supported keeping the standards EISA enacted. First, 
reversing EISA would allow the “banned” light bulbs these manufacturers have stopped 
 
 
Actual 
Savings 
Reported 
Savings 
Existing lamp 100w inc 
 Market allowance 
 
72w inc 
Replacement Lamp (-) 17w LED 17w LED 
Wattage saved 83w 55w 
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producing back into market, which would mainly benefit overseas manufacturers. 
Second, many states already have efficiency laws. EISA reduces the patchwork of state 
laws and efficiency standards by setting a minimum, which helps lighting manufacturers 
streamlining product assortment. While EISA had some unintended consequences, such 
as the reduction in “claimed” energy savings for electric utilities, majority of EISA’s 
lighting policy have made positive impact to the lighting industry and EE. 
 
4.5 Policy Comparison 
 
Using the rubric in the start of this section, the policies are compared to one another.  
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Policy Highlights Check List of 
Successful EE Policy 
Success from Failures 
EPAct 1992 
Prioritizing conservation as the 
preferred method of electric resource 
planning 
 
First lighting efficiency regulation 
 
Set lumen per watt minimum for 
PAR lamps, 4’ and 8’ fluorescent 
lamps 
 
Affected the most popularly used 
lamps 
 
Largely effective in energy savings, 
due to widespread impact 
 
Blueprint for future regulatory policy 
EE Effectiveness √ 
Cost-Effective √ 
Fairness / Equity √ 
Clarity √ 
Stimulate 
Innovation 
 
 
 
Giving energy conservation 
value 
 
Largely effective in energy 
savings, due to widespread 
impact 
 
Cost-effective for 
government to regulate, 
minor cost increase to 
manufacturers and 
consumers 
 
Applied fairly throughout 
lighting industry and to 
consumers 
 
Clear regulations set for 
manufacturers, became 
blueprint for future 
regulatory policy 
 
Didn’t support or encourage 
innovation in lighting 
technology  
 
Relied on manufacturers to 
self-improve existing 
technology or for consumer 
demand to warranty lighting 
technology improvements. 
EPAct 2005 
No changes in efficiency regulation 
 
Accelerated tax deduction incentive 
 
Ambiguously defined and loose 
oversight  
 
Largely ineffective in promoting 
energy savings 
 
‘Prizes for Achievement in Grand 
Challenges of Science and 
Technology’ 
EE Effectiveness  
Cost-Effective  
Fairness / Equity  
Clarity  
Stimulate 
Innovation 
√ 
 
 
 ‘Prizes for Achievement in 
Grand Challenges of 
Science and Technology’ 
provides the DOE with the 
resources and guidance to 
establish awards for 
technology innovation 
 
Helps to remove 
uncertainty in technology, 
rewards R&D, and lessens 
the negative externality of 
investing in RD&D.   
 
Slightly improved EE of 
projects that were already or 
most likely moving forward 
 
Expensive to meet 
qualifications, benefit of 
energy savings to cost of 
implementation is low 
 
Lacked equity, obtaining the 
incentive required significant 
time and financial investments 
 
Ambiguous requirements, 
confusing for the duration of 
tax incentive 
EISA 2007 
Labeling requirement for lamps 
 
Minimum EE standard, essentially 
banning incandescent lamps & raises 
the minimum CRI LPW exception 
 
DOE directive to review and revised 
minimum LPW standard for PAR 
and reflector lamps, U bend, 4’, and 
8’ fluorescent lamps 
 
Directs DOE to create ‘Bright 
Tomorrow Lighting Prize’: L Prize 
 
Mandates review and potential 
increase of LPW standards between 
2014-2017 
EE Effectiveness √ 
Cost-Effective ? 
Fairness / Equity √ 
Clarity √ 
Stimulate 
Innovation 
√ 
 
 
Significant energy savings 
due to inefficient product 
removed from market and 
increased LPW standard for 
majority of available 
lighting products 
 
Applied fairly throughout 
lighting industry and to 
consumers 
 
Clear regulations set for 
manufacturers 
 
Directs DOE to create 
‘Bright Tomorrow Lighting 
Prize’: L Prize. Highly 
successful in advancing 
LED lighting technology. 
 
 
Increased LPW standard 
removed many lighting 
products from the market, 
making lighting updates 
expensive, particularly after 
lighting incentives to 
consumers were reduced or 
discontinued 
 
Reduced and discontinued 
incentive impact utilities 
ability to claim ‘actual’ 
energy savings 
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In addition to the rubric, energy savings potential and increased efficiency as sole 
components of policy success is represented below. The graph reflects the energy savings 
potential of 4’ linear fluorescent lamps as new and improved technology is mandated. T8 
4’ 28w and 25w lamps have been available since the late 2000s.   
  
Figure 6 
 
In summary, the most effective Federal lighting efficiency policy is EISA 2007. EPAct 
1992 successfully regulated inefficient equipment from the market in a cost-effective and 
equitable manner, but didn’t encourage innovation or technology advancement. EPAct 
2005 was the opposite. It wasn’t cost-effective, equitable, or significantly impacted 
energy savings, but did create an outlet to foster innovation through ‘Prizes for 
Achievement in Grand Challenges of Science and Technology’. The cost to implement 
new lighting due to regulations can be argued against EISA 2007’s cost-effectiveness. 
But EISA 2007 is highly successful by regulating and removing inefficient equipment, 
mandating the DOE periodically review lighting efficiency standards, and creating a 
competitive incentive contest to spur lighting innovation. By combining regulations and 
incentives, energy savings is maximized. This is explored further in the L Prize. 
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5. Combing Regulations & Incentives: The L Prize 
 
EISA is the first Federal lighting policy to include an innovation contest and award 
incentive. The L Prize contest revolutionizes the lighting industry and changes the 
lighting market by focusing R&D on the LED. 
  
5.1 L Prize Background 
 
Sponsored by the DOE as directed by EISA 2007, the L Prize is the first government-
sponsored lighting technology competition. The L Prize purpose is to stimulate lighting 
manufacturer competition to foster innovation in LED lighting and accelerate market 
availability of LED lighting.  
 
The L Prize submission process as specified by the DOE: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
There L Prize consists of three award categories: 60w ‘A’ bulb incandescent LED 
equivalent replacement, PAR 38 halogen replacement, and a not yet fully developed 
category for an LED lamp that delivers over 150 lumens per watt, known as the ‘21st 
Century’ lamp.  
 
The 60w replacement L Prize winners would be awarded a cash prize of $10M, federal 
purchasing agreements, utility and other incentives. In August 2011, Philips Lighting was 
awarded the L Prize in the 60w incandescent replacement category. No other lighting 
manufacturer submitted to the category after Philips Lighting. Whether it is sour grapes, 
lack of technical capability at the moment, or a conscious financial choice is unknown.  
 
Evaluation Part 
1: 
Submission 
Review 
Evaluation Part 2: 
Photometric Testing 
Manufacturing capability assessment 
Lumen maintenance testing 
Field assessments 
Stress testing 
Intent to 
Submit 
Entry Package 
Submission 
L Prize 
Winner(s) 
Announced 
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Currently the PAR 38 replacement has been suspended due to inability to reach the 
minimum LPW required. Effective June 13, 2014 the DOE announced no entries would 
be accepted, “current LED PAR 38 products on the market fall far short of reaching the 
rigorous L Prize targets, making it unlikely DOE will receive a qualifying entry in a 
reasonable amount of time” (U.S. DOE, 2014). The DOE makes clear that Congress set 
the qualifications and DOE is not allowed to lower the efficacy (LPW) target required, 
but will monitor the market in hopes to re-open the contest. The lofty ‘21st Century’ lamp 
contest guidelines are under development and hope to be open for competition in the 
future. 
 
5.2 L Prize Theory: Incentivizing Innovation 
 
Figure 8 
 
If a technology is “particularly desirable”, narrower RD&D policies should be pursued, 
including technology prizes and financial incentives (Fischer et al., 2012). Policies that 
generate technology may be as, or more important for helping the environment, then the 
rules and regulations we typically think of as environmental policies (Jaffe et al., 2004). 
Providing targeted assistance to innovation can reduce market barriers, negative 
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externalities, and accelerate market penetration (Tonn & Peretz, 2007; Fischer et al., 
2012). The L Prize is an excellent example of technology benefitting the environment and 
reducing market barriers and negative externalities to innovation. The L Prize highlights 
three important issues:  
 Program/contest design is critical for success 
 Importance of reducing negative externalities in innovation 
 Incentives work 
 
5.2.1 Program Design 
 
Getting the design of the contest and prize correct is critical (Newell & Wilson, 2005). It 
is important for policy makers to minimize asymmetrical information by either 
understanding the technology to be incentivized or seek advisement by specialists in the 
field. This is accomplished by directing the DOE to design and manage the L Prize. 
 
LED lighting had potential, but focused RD&D was needed to expedite marketable 
product. Narrow definition, specific, and measurable objective allow competitors to know 
where they should focus their efforts in a technology contest (Newell & Wilson, 2005). 
By clearly stating in EISA the L Prize parameters and DOE setting clear technical and 
submission requirements, lighting manufacturers have a greater probability for success.  
 
To counteract the uncertainty of investing in R&D, the L Prize offers large incentives to 
the winner(s). An ex ante prize, when the “technological threshold or target is specified 
prior to when the research takes place” (Newell & Wilson 2005), focuses lighting 
manufacturers R&D and gives them incentive to be the innovator. Manufacturers’ 
motivation could be based on financial award, government purchasing policy, publicity, 
or prestige. Development of L-Prize qualifications and reward was successful in 
providing enough incentives to encourage manufacturers, but not overly large which 
could lead to R&D saturation. It also set the precedence of open technical competition in 
lighting. 
 
27 
 
The L Prize galvanized the lighting industry by fostering a highly competitive and 
technical competition with limited winners. Manufacturers realized if they didn’t win, 
some else would. In order to stay relevant and prosperous in the lighting industry they 
would need competing product.  
 
5.2.2 Reducing Negative Externalities 
 
Technology is not free. R&D takes place in private and public institutions to create 
innovation, which is expensive and without guarantee of financial return. Traditionally, 
patents and property rights are how innovators are temporarily reward for their invention. 
But patents and property rights are time sensitive or often infringed upon with limited 
courses of action. Knowledge spillover takes place when an innovative product is brought 
to market, competitors can learn and copy the process or technique, the financial 
recuperation of the innovating firm becomes a fraction of the original financial gain 
(Jaffe et al., 2004). Similarly, learning effect can inhibit innovation, as competitors 
benefit from the experience of their predecessors, who have often shouldered most of the 
RD&D costs (Fischer et al., 2012).  
 
Additionally, economies of scale are an issue for many new technologies (Tonn & Peretz, 
2007). Production costs are high and there is initial uncertainty on market penetration. 
Furthermore, even if the innovative product becomes commercially viable, there is no 
guarantee of market adoption or diffusion. This can inhibit implementation of energy 
savings technology, as no one wants invest in an unproven product. 
 
The L Prize resulted in the innovation paradox of knowledge spillover to competitors, as 
many of the winning design components and thermal properties are copied by 
competitors. As seen in Figure 9, the LPW in LEDs significantly increases. This is due to 
knowledge spillover and decreased learning effect, which has led to continual 
improvements on LED design. Though through the L Prize, the DOE is successful at 
counterbalancing knowledge spillover for the winning manufacturer. This is done by 
expediting diffusion of the winning product through correcting imperfect information 
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held by consumers. Uncertainty about quality and reliability of a new technology can lead 
to short-sided choices and behavioral failure, which inhibit dispersion of new technology 
(Tonn & Peretz, 2007; Fischer et al., 2012). Due to DOE’s rigorous testing and 
government installations, the government is able to influencing market adoption by 
signaling to the public that LED technology is market ready. Additionally, EISA’s LPW 
minimum policy encourages market growth, while DOE garners consumer acceptance of 
the new technology. This is particularly true for the L Prize winner: Philips LED. 
Through the DOE’s endorsement, installations, and recommendation Philips product is 
viewed as superior in comparison to competitors. 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
Government use of award or cash incentives can spur innovation and technology growth. The private R&D invested into this 
competition made LED lighting not only possible, but substantially improved the technology. This is shown by the dramatic increase 
of LED LPW once the L Prize was awarded (Figure 9). Data from: DOE: Solid-State Lighting Research & Development – Multi-Year 
Program Plan, Quinn: LED History 101. 
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5.2.3 Incentives work 
 
Innovation contests can lead to successful technological breakthroughs (Newell & Wilson 
2005). By incentivizing companies to actively compete, reaching the technical innovation 
goal improves. So does the potential of one and eventually more of these companies 
developing competing products, which eventually reduces cost and increases dispersion. 
Looking to encouraging innovation and increase dispersion, offering a contest or reward 
helps complete both these goals.  
 
Finding the right incentive(s) is key. Publicity from the DOE and product priority in 
government contracts is worth more than any cash award the DOE could offer. In an 
interview Philips Lighting CEO Zia Eftekhar is asked about the $10M prize associated 
with winning the L Prize. Eftekhar responds, “Philips’ investment in the development of 
the L Prize far exceeded the award money” (Illuminating Engineering Society, 2011). 
Cash incentive and purchasing agreement (another form of cash incentive) are important 
to defray R&D costs, but publicity is more important. Publicity or “bragging rights” may 
be hard to associate a dollar value, but can be a large or the motivating factor. By creating 
correct incentives, the L Prize not only led to significant energy savings, but transformed 
the lighting industry.  
 
The L Prize catalyzed significant improvements in LED lighting. This allows for EE 
savings many years earlier than expected. Additionally, it is a success story of regulations 
and incentives complementing each other to achieve significant energy savings potential. 
Policy makers should review and apply this relationship to other technology and EE 
programs.  
 
6. State EE Regulation & Incentive: Minnesota 
 
Taking EE a step further than Federal regulation, many states have enacted their own EE 
requirements, known as EERS. State requirements take into account Federal efficiency 
minimums, as the Federal policies often establish the minimum baseline for rebate 
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programs. EERS typically set EE goals for utilities to meet and offer incentives to meet 
these goals.  
 
Minnesota has been aggressive in setting high EERS for utilities to meet. One of the most 
significant initiatives toward increasing EE is Minnesota’s legislature and governor 
passing the Next Generation Energy Act of 2007 (NGEA).  NGEA is another example of 
regulation paired with incentive. The NGEA legislation set statewide goals for reducing 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions (Revisor of Statues – State of Minnesota, 2007). 
This is accomplished through increasing investments and setting mandatory goals for 
renewable power and energy conservation programs (MnSCN, 2014). Typically cash 
incentives from the utility are offered to EE program participants, with the utility 
recouping those costs from the state. Minnesota utilities use Conservation Improvement 
Programs (CIP) to track energy savings and apply for compensation in meeting the 
energy regulations.  A 2012 analysis of state incentives, policies, and combinations find 
utilities with DSM programs located in states with EERS policies “achieve a significantly 
great amount of electricity savings” than those without such combinations of policy and 
incentives (Carley, 2012).  
 
In 2013, Minnesota ranked 11
th
 on American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 
(ACEEE) annual “State Energy Efficiency Scorecard” (ACEEE, 2013). This State 
Scorecard compares each state’s EE policy and programmatic efforts. Taking into 
account not only current EE policy, but the continued and long-term efforts to expand 
and grow EE programs. These policies reflect investments in EE and renewable energy 
programs, in addition to mandatory building energy codes.  While 11
th
 place is a solid 
ranking, Minnesota has fallen from previous rankings of 8
th
 in 2011 and 9
th
 in 2012 
(ACEEE 2011, ACEEE 2012). Minnesota has made significant advancements in EE 
policy and regulations, though more can be done. Especially if Minnesota wants to be a 
leader in energy savings and reducing CO2 emissions.  
 
Of particular concern to power utilities, State, and Federal officials is the cost-
effectiveness of EE and CO2 reductions. Utility EE programs have long been touted as 
31 
 
the most cost-effective solution to reduce CO2 emissions and manage energy needs (Eto 
et al., 1996; Tonn & Peretz, 2007; Friedrich et al., 2009). A 2007 study finds EE program 
benefit-cost ratios are typically greater than 3:1 (Tonn & Peretz, 2007). According to a 
2009 study by ACEEE, the cost of implementing EE incentives by utilities range from 
$0.016 to $0.033 per kWh and an average cost of $0.025 per kWh (Friedrich et al., 2009). 
Other research on the cost-effectiveness of utility EE programs found the cost to be 
$0.037 kWh to implement (Eto et al., 1996). This is compared to the cost of generating 
power from low CO2 sources, such as combined-cycle natural gas ranging from $0.07 to 
$0.10 kWh and no CO2 emission energy source of wind costs between $0.04 and $0.09 
per kWh (Friedrich et al., 2009).  
 
Minnesota’s largest electric utility is Xcel Energy, providing service to 60% of 
Minnesota’s electric customers (Burdette, 2014). In their 2013 Minnesota CIP regulatory 
filing, Xcel Energy reports spending of $79.6M on their electric EE portfolio with 
approximate net benefits of $250M (Xcel Energy, 2013). The benefit-cost ratio of over 
4:1 is excellent.  
 
6.1 Utility EE Program: Lighting 
 
Lighting EE incentive programs offer significant and cost-effective energy savings. Xcel 
Energy attributes success in their Business Segment primarily to Lighting Efficiency and 
Process Efficiency programs (Xcel Energy, 2013). Lighting Efficiency and alternative 
CIP lighting programs saved approximately 100.1 GWh and comprises 30.7 percent of all 
energy savings in 2013 (total energy saving from Xcel Energy’s business 2013 EE 
portfolio, including alternative CIPs is 325.6 GWh) (Xcel Energy, 2013). Lighting 
program benefit to cost ratios is well over 1.0, which is considered the minimum 
threshold of a cost-effective program. Xcel Energy submitted a Total Resource Cost Test 
benefit-cost ratio of 1.88 and Societal Test benefit-cost ratio of 1.93 for its lighting EE 
incentive programs (Xcel Energy, 2013).  
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Xcel Energy provided over $10.5M in rebates to 2013 lighting efficiency participants 
(Xcel Energy, 2013). This comprises 38 percent of the total rebate dollars offered in the 
EE portfolio (total business segment and alternative CIPs rebate incentive paid in 2013 is 
approximately $26.7) (Xcel Energy, 2013). In 2013, out of 21 business segment and 
alternative EE programs offered by Xcel Energy, lighting incentive programs are second 
only to computer efficiency in highest participation utilization (Xcel Energy, 2013). 
 
Utilities and DSM programs in the “post-EISA era” face new challenges in reaching EE 
goals. The 2013 CIP filing reflects the first year after EISA standards have eliminated the 
most egregiously inefficient lighting. Also due to EISA, this filing reflects the first 
energy savings calculations using lower existing baselines wattages, which affects 
reported energy savings.  While 100.1 GWh savings in 2013 is significant, Xcel Energy’s 
2012 CIP filing reported 152.7 GWh savings from Lighting Efficiency and alternative 
CIP lighting programs. Reflecting a 34 percent drop in reportable savings, while State 
EERS goals remain the same. In addition to State requirements, utilities may use DSM to 
meet EPA CO2 emission regulation. While EISA is successful in raising lighting 
efficiency standards for the nation, it also creates new barriers for utilities in reaching 
state mandated EERS through DSM programs. Many of the barriers will stem from 
consumer awareness and ability to increase DSM participation rates to offset lower 
claimed savings. 
 
Questions to address these barriers include: 
 Are utility customers aware of regulations affecting them?  
 Will utility customers become resistant to implementing EE improvements due to 
‘force’ of regulations?  
 How will utilities meet EE goals with decreased reported savings due to EISA’s 
impact?  
 What can be done to encourage utility customers to adopt the newest energy 
efficient lighting technologies available, such as LEDs and 25w and 28w 4’ T8 
lamps? 
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Program evaluators, policy makers, utilities, and private sector professionals need 
methodologies to evaluate and estimate how DSM rebate incentives affect 
implementation of EE equipment (Horowitz, 2001, Newell & Wilson, 2005). Studies of 
rebate program participants can provide needed information on the public’s 
comprehension of regulations, in addition to if and what incentives catalyze EE 
implementation. Thorough evaluations of EE rebate programs will increased policy 
makers understanding of the actual effectiveness and efficiency of policy, in addition to 
how policy design influences the results they achieve (Newell & Wilson, 2005). Majority 
of empirical evidence on effectiveness of financial incentives are based on tax credits and 
tax incentives (Metcalf, 2007; Gillingham et al., 2009). The survey and evaluation 
conducted in this paper is different from previous studies, as respondents are DSM rebate 
program participants. This analysis seeks to understand participant motives, impressions, 
and barriers to EE in the “post-EISA era”. Allowing the analysis and results to serve as a 
tool to overcome such barriers and improve future EE policy. 
 
7. Survey Background & Methodology 
 
The Lighting Rebate Program (LRP) provides technical assistance, facilitates rebate, and 
offers financing assistance to participants. These participants are non-residential electric 
utility customers, who are considered to be a small to medium energy user as defined by 
the electric utility.  
 
In March of 2014, a semi-annual survey was sent to participants in the LRP. Participant 
would be defined as a single employee or representative of a business that received a 
rebate incentive through the LRP (referred to as respondent or participant). These survey 
results represent respondents who participated in the LRP from June of 2013 through 
December of 2013. The timing is significant, because these are the first participants in the 
LRP after EISA and DOE lighting regulations came into full effect. The change not only 
includes available lighting technology, as most incandescent and T12 lamps are 
discontinued, but also modifications in rebate structure for these existing systems.  
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This is the first time questions were included to solicit participant’s opinions, 
impressions, and knowledge of lighting regulations, rebate incentives, and incentive 
preference between a cash rebate or 0% interest rate financing. The survey consisted of 
20 questions, 8 of which applied to this study. These questions are grouped by topic, 
collecting mainly nominal data, and survey structure involving: multiple choice (multiple 
response and single response), comparative, Likert scale, and conditional branching. No 
survey completion incentives are offered to participants. 
 
There were a total of 690 projects that received rebate during this time span, with 
approximately 448 unique users. A unique user may have had one or multiple projects 
that participated in the LRP. A single project within the LRP would consist of a building 
site with one or multiple electrical meters, under one account holder, with an individual 
address. A unique user with multiple projects would be for example, a property manager 
of a multiple building apartment complex or an owner of multiple chain restaurants. 
Given the redundancy of responses, they represent only one respondent within the survey. 
This was done to reduce “weighting” of survey respondents. 
 
Three methods were employed to solicit survey responses: email, mail, and follow up 
phone call with offer to complete survey via phone call. First, the online survey link was 
emailed to all available contacts through a survey system with two subsequent reminder 
emails to participate in the survey. The online survey participation window ran for 6 
weeks from end of March 2014 to mid-May 2014. Out of 310 unique email contacts, 104 
respondents answered one or more questions, resulting in a 33.5 percent response rate. 
Once the online survey was closed, 138 surveys were mailed to unique LRP participants. 
One month after mailing surveys, a calling service placed phone calls to 105 unique LRP 
participants who had not completed an online or mailed survey, with an offer to complete 
the survey via the phone call. Tracking methods are employed to prevent duplicate 
response. Of the 138 mailed surveys and the 105 phone surveys, 202 respondents 
answered one or more questions. Overall, out of 448 potential unique respondents, 306 
responded to one or more of the questions, resulting in a response rate of approximate 68 
percent. 
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7.1 General Survey Limitations 
 
While obtaining raw data and compiling three survey methods (online, mail, and phone) 
the possibility of recording error is present. Every effort was made to ensure best survey 
practices took place, providing unbiased responses (Alreck & Settle, 2004). It is 
necessary to acknowledge a variety of errors may have unknowingly taken place and/or 
out of survey administrators control. 
 
7.2 Sampling Biases 
 Non-response bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004): LRP participants who have a positive 
experience maybe more likely to complete the survey than those indifferent about 
the program. Higher participation response could also come from participants 
who had a poor experience, which would counterbalance potential to skew the 
data.  
 Self-selection bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004): Response to the survey is voluntary. 
 Accessibility bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004): Some respondents are easier to access 
and could become over selected. With 3 types of survey media options (online, 
mail, and phone) and follow up, this bias is significantly minimized.  
 
7.3 Response Biases 
 Social desirability bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004): Respondents may overstate their 
desire for participating in LRP due to environmental concerns, instead of financial 
savings, as environmental concern appears more socially desirable or acceptable. 
Additionally, in desire to appear knowledgeable, respondents may overstate their 
awareness or knowledge on lighting and/or regulation. 
 Acquiescence Bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004):  Majority of respondents replies by 
the less personal format of online or mail survey. This reduces desire to be 
“agreeable” to the survey facilitator.  
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 Order (or Sequence) Bias (Alreck & Settle, 2004):  LRP respondents may become 
complacent in responses, settle into routine responses, and/or suffer from survey 
fatigue.  
 
7.4 Survey Composition  
 
To respect the time of respondents, there is a concerted effort to make the survey brief 
and focused. With this in mind, there are limitations in question clarity and vocabulary. 
This could cause some respondents to not fully understand terms or inaccurately respond, 
causing instrumentation bias and error (Alreck & Settle, 2004). Though all efforts are 
made to fully explain in plain, non-technical terms survey questions and response 
options, with additional space available for respondents to comment. 
 
7.5 Additional Error or Biases 
 Potential of someone, other than the proper or most involved individual in the 
LRP, receiving and answering the survey.  
 Requiring an over-demanding recall of the individual’s perception or participation 
in the LRP. 
 Uncertainty of terminology or misunderstanding of survey question. 
 Conditional branching not always properly followed by respondents, this involves 
Q6 and Q7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
8. Data Results & Discussion 
Survey questions are listed with response percentage, survey with results located in the 
appendix. 
 Yes No Not Sure 
Q1. Would you have preferred 0% financing loan over receiving a 
rebate to change your lights?  
5% 80% 15% 
Q2. If no rebate had been available, would you have changed to the 
new lighting?  
33% 40% 27% 
Q3. Did you have/use T12s in your previous lighting? 33% 51% 16% 
Q5. Do you think energy efficiency programs are beneficial? 96% 1% 3% 
Q6. Were you aware of energy regulations making certain lights 
obsolete or no longer manufactured? 
74% 26% N/A 
Q8. Do you think lighting energy efficiency standards and regulations 
are beneficial? 
74% 9% 17% 
 
 Did not 
factor 
into 
decision 
Nice but 
not 
necessary 
Some-
what 
Important 
Very 
important, 
factored 
into 
decision 
Would not 
have 
completed 
project 
without it 
Q4. How much of a factor did 
rebate make in deciding to proceed 
with the lighting project?  
 
2% 
 
11% 
 
20% 
 
42.5% 
 
24.5% 
 
 Not at 
all 
Slight 
impact 
Some 
impact 
Large 
impact 
Sole reason 
for changing 
lights 
Q7. If you were aware of the regulations, 
how much did this impact your decision 
to change your lights? 
 
43% 
 
26% 
 
3% 
 
24% 
 
4% 
 
8.1 Awareness of Regulations (Q 3, Q 6, & Q 7) 
 
These questions are asked to gauge participant’s knowledge of their existing lighting 
system, knowledge of regulation affecting lighting availability, and impact of regulation 
on their decision process. Often lack of information, asymmetrical information, and 
behavioral failure are reasons why consumers don’t invest in EE (Tonn & Peretz, 2007; 
Gillingham et al., 2009). 
 
Leading up to 2013, there was significant outreach by utilities, lighting manufacturers, 
and lighting suppliers to educate consumers of upcoming changes to rebate incentives 
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and availability of lighting product due to regulations. Rebates for T12 systems would 
decrease to a fraction available in previous years (2012 and prior). This is due to utilities 
adjusting their minimum efficiency baseline to meet EISA standards.  
 
Over one-quarter of respondents are unaware of lighting regulations and one-third of 
respondents had T12s and did not take advantage of significantly higher rebate available 
in prior years. Overlap in these categories would infer issues of asymmetrical information 
in regulation and lighting technology. Even with the best of campaigns, not all users of 
obsolete equipment can be notified of changes. Additionally, many people are unaware of 
the type of lighting they have and therefore unsure if regulations apply to them. If a 
participant had T12s (33 percent) and been aware of lighting regulations (74 percent), but 
not participated earlier due to cash flow, this would imply behavioral failure. In this 
situation, behavioral failure takes place when an individual knowingly underinvests in 
energy efficiency by not taking advantage of previously offered significantly higher 
rebates (Tonn & Peretz, 2007; Gillingham et al., 2009). This subgroup could account for 
28 percent of respondents finding regulation a large or sole reason for participation.  
 
Overall awareness of lighting regulations is quite high (74 percent), which should be 
attributed to the educational efforts of utility EE programs, lighting suppliers, and the 
DOE.  In determining impact of EISA and DOE regulations to participant rates, 69 
percent of respondents considered regulations having little or no impact on their decision 
to install EE lighting. This could be due to three reasons. First, their existing lighting 
system may have been exempt or not part of EISA and DOE regulations. Second, their 
lighting may have been minimally impacted by EISA and DOE regulations. Third, some 
LRP participants’ existing systems may have been subject to efficiency regulations, but 
they were unaware of the lighting regulations (26%)
1
.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Disclaimer: Conditional branching was flawed in moving from Q6 to Q7.  Q6 received 221 ‘Yes’ responses to awareness of 
regulations affect lighting. Q7 received 250 responses on impact regulations made on their decision to implement new lighting. Data 
for Q7 would be more accurate if responses had totaled 221 or less.  
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8.2 Perceptions of Regulations & Incentives (Q 5 & Q 8) 
 
The LRP offers technical assistance and cash rebate incentives to all eligible participants. 
Asking if energy efficiency programs are beneficial could be considered vague. Though 
given the survey sole context is LRP and EE, it is safe to infer survey participants 
understood the connection of LRP to ‘energy efficiency programs’. Overwhelmingly (96 
percent) respondents find EE programs beneficial. When surveyed if lighting energy 
efficiency standards and regulations are beneficial 74 percent agreed.  
 
There is two-fold reason for asking these questions: gauging respondent’s perception of 
EE incentives and regulations, and to compare these results. Participant buy-in is needed 
for both incentives and regulations to be effective and sustaining. Regulations can be 
overturned or undone by government officials, particularly if constituents raise enough 
support. Incentives are only successful if they are utilized and achieve the desired 
outcome. Resistance or negative beliefs to either can inhibit the intended goal.  
 
A significant amount of LRP participants find both EE incentives and regulations 
beneficial. It is not surprising that incentives through the energy efficiency program are 
looked upon more favorably than regulations. People prefer choices over forced action, in 
addition to financial compensation to make a choice (Stern, 1999; Gillingham et al., 
2009). Given LRP participant high awareness (Q6. 74 percent) and equally high 
perceived benefit (Q8. 74 percent) of EE standards and regulations, it appears 
respondents see EE standards and regulations positively. Respondents like the ‘carrot’ 
more, but the ‘stick’ isn’t so bad. 
 
8.3 Incentives Needed if Regulations Exist? (Q 2 & Q4) 
 
These questions look at the most frequently cited issues with incentives: free-riding and 
behavioral failure.  
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Some organizations, public officials, and individuals argue that incentives offered by 
utilities or the government are unnecessary. Those opposed to incentives question energy 
savings and usefulness of incentive based EE programs. Concerns include: biases from 
utilities calculating cost-effectiveness of DSM, extent of free-riding, economic 
efficiencies, moral hazards
2
, and behavioral failure (Graetz, 2012; Loughran & Kulick, 
2004; Wirl, 2000). Behavioral failure stems from the belief a ‘smart consumer’ would 
switch to something more efficient regardless, because it would save them money and 
therefore energy (Jacoby-Hawkins, 2014). Free-ridership is when people would have 
purchased the energy efficient equipment without needing incentives, but still applies for 
and receive the incentive. In addition to free-riding, those opposed to EE incentive 
programs raise concerns on equity in tax codes and rate-payer contributions to 
conservation improvement funds, which fund many utility EE incentive programs 
(Fullerton, 2001; Graetz, 2012). 
 
Some of these concerns are valid and useful. Particularly in determining the need and 
amount of incentives, and calculating actual energy savings from EE programs.  There 
are counterpoints to the contentions of freeriding and behavioral failure. The spillover 
effects, where others implement energy efficient equipment without rebates is not 
acknowledged by those opposing incentives (Gillingham et al., 2006). The argument of 
free-ridership is dispelled when considering the avoided cost of building additional power 
sources. These avoided costs benefit all utility customers, whether or not they participate 
in an EE program. Studies of data used by those asserting energy savings from EE 
policies are inflated or outright fraudulent have been refuted (Auffhammer et al., 2008). 
Additionally, incentives and information from DSM programs correct asymmetrical 
information by providing credibility to the incentivized EE technology, leading to 
increased dispersion (Anderson & Newell, 2004; Tonn & Peretz, 2007). 
 
When asked “if no rebate had been available, would you have changed to the new 
lighting”, 33 percent of respondents said yes (Q2). This would imply free-ridership, as 
                                                 
2
 Moral Hazards in this context refers to utility customers strategically using less efficient technology 
knowing the utility will (increase the) subsidize for more EE equipment. Or the potential of utility customer 
lying about existing equipment to obtain cash incentive from the utility. 
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respondents would make the change regardless of rebate. Noteworthy to this discussion, 
the respondents that had T12s (33 percent) which are affected by regulations, is the same 
percentage that would have switched without rebate (33 percent). New lighting systems 
implemented by T12 users must be more efficient than the EISA baseline to qualify for 
rebate incentives. Meaning these new systems are more efficient than the regulatory 
minimum. In this scenario, free-riding is not only prevented, but used to increase energy 
savings. This is done by successfully incentivizing LRP participants to go above-and-
beyond the regulated energy savings. 
 
The results from Q2 are more complicated than expected due to respondents choosing 
‘Not Sure’ (27 percent). This could be attributed to satisfaction of energy savings or 
reduction of CO2 footprint from the new lighting system. Though, most likely 
uncertainty results from improved working condition. In my experience as a lighting 
consultant, the response of ‘Not Sure’ is due to light quality improvements. Typically 
customers enjoy or find the new lighting superior to the existing. Finding the investment 
in lighting worth it, possibly without rebate. Often I hear LRP participants say they could 
never go back to the old lighting. This is an interesting area to consider, as incentives 
correct behavioral failure and asymmetrical information in ‘Not Sure’ respondents.  
 
A significant portion (40 percent) would not have changed to more EE lighting without 
rebate. From an economic standpoint, incentives work to correct behavioral failure in this 
subset. Important for policy makers and EE program facilitators to consider, potentially 
two-thirds of participants (No and Not Sure respondents) would not have installed EE 
lighting without rebate. The incentive stimulates significant interest in EE measures.  
 
Further gauging incentive significance, this survey analyzes how much rebate factors into 
the decision making process. This question produces distinctive response. Rebate clearly 
factors into the decision, 87 percent finding the rebate somewhat important, very 
important, or would not have completed the project without it. Only 13 percent of LPR 
respondents find the rebate not necessary or not even factoring into the decision. These 
results show incentives are a significant factor in deciding to participate in an EE 
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program, further dispelling the concerns of free-riding. Policies that address both market 
and behavioral failures are highly effective (Gillingham et al., 2009), the LRP incentives 
are targeting both failures successfully.  
 
8.4 Preferred Type of Incentive (Q1) 
 
Given survey length and number of perspective respondents, locating incentive ‘tipping 
point’, the point when a respondent would or would not proceed with the EE measure, is 
not feasible. Instead the survey looks for incentive preference. The choice given to 
respondents is the cash rebate incentive received or zero percent interest rate financing 
option.  Majority of respondents prefer their cash rebate incentive (80 percent) compared 
to those preferring no interest financing (5 percent), with 15 percent of respondents 
unsure of their preference. Stern’s 1999 study on participation rates and EE incentive 
preference between cash incentives or zero-interest loans found similar results (Stern, 
1999). These results may sound obvious, but policy makers and EE program facilitators 
should take this into consideration. Even when financed for “free”, majority of EE 
participants would prefer a rebate cash incentive. 
 
Often policy makers and EE 
advocates tout lack of 
financing significantly 
prevents EE improvements. 
The ability to finance EE 
projects should be available, 
especially to avoid consumers 
underinvesting in EE 
technology (Gillingham et al., 
2009). Though access to cash 
or financing constraints, have 
yet to be empirically 
established (Gillingham et al., 
Highlights from LRP survey responses: 
- Cash rebate incentives are considered more valuable to 
EE program participants than financing options 
- Rebate incentives are a significant motivator to EE 
program participants, dispelling concerns of free-riding 
- Even if participation wasn’t solely motivated by rebate 
incentive, 94 percent consider energy efficiency 
programs beneficial 
- Generally EE program participants are aware of 
regulations 
- Lighting regulations played a minor role in 
implementation of EE improvements 
- While both are viewed favorably by LRP participants, 
EE programs are considered more beneficial (96 
percent) than EE standards and regulations (74 percent) 
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2009). This survey confirms trading-off rebate incentives for financing, even 0 percent 
financing, would prove costly to EE participation rates. LRP respondents clearly find 
value in the cash rebate incentives offered.  
 
 8.5 Overcoming EISA Barriers 
 
Are utility customers aware of regulations affecting them? Yes, they are. 
Will utility customers become resistant to implementing EE improvements due to ‘force’ 
of regulations? No, regulations appear understood and considered beneficial. 
 
The most surprising survey response: almost three-quarters of respondents are aware 
regulations impacted their lighting choices. In my field experience, most individuals are 
unaware of the lighting system at their work, place of worship, or even at home. Quite 
possibly some respondents are aware of changes, but unaware of how they will be 
affected. Though as expected, some LRP participants gave ‘colorful’ responses 
referencing government infringement on choice and allowing free-market correction, but 
majority of comments were positive. Publicizing changes to lighting stock and gradual 
phasing out of inefficient products by media and concerted efforts of DOE, electric utility 
EE programs, lighting manufacturers, and lighting suppliers, can be credited with such 
high consumer awareness. Due to these education efforts, the public was aware of 
upcoming changes and could prepare. Granted some prepared by stocking up on lamps 
that would no longer be sold. Though many looked to change out their inefficient lighting 
and participate in LRPs, such as this one.  
 
How will utilities meet EE goals with decreased reported savings due to EISA’s impact?   
By educating and encouraging customer participation in EE programs, such as the LRP. 
 
“[G]reater DSM/EE program efforts…make the adoption of DSM/EE programs more 
likely and also increase, on average, the total amount of savings” (Carley, 2012). 
Incentive and educational efforts should not be overlooked when considering EE policy 
and regulations. In this situation, knowledge is power to make an educated decision in 
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whether or not to participate in an EE program. Previous surveys also find the importance 
of educating and incentivizing those who implement EE equipment (RFF, 1979; Stern, 
1999; Horowitz, 2001; Anderson & Newell, 2004; Geller, 2006; Heap & Kasemo, 2010). 
Even stating aggressive incentivizing efforts should be made to encourage energy 
conservation (Ford Foundation, 1979). Incentives are needed because even if regulations 
exist, energy conservation (on the individual level) can’t be mandated (Ford Foundation, 
1979).  
 
What can be done to encourage utility customers to adopt the newest energy efficient 
lighting technologies available, such as LEDs and 25w and 28w 4’ T8 lamps?  
Evaluate cash rebate incentive offerings, particularly to encouraged high energy saving 
technology. Periodically survey EE rebate program participant interests and desires.  
 
Rebate incentives are an important tool to maximize participation in EE programs. A 
2001 study found T8s were 50 percent of the market share in areas that offered EE 
rebates, compared to 30 percent in areas that offered no rebates (Horowitz, 2001). 
Additionally, from 1986 to 2000, 74 percent of electronic ballasts purchased were due to 
EE programs, resulting in energy savings that reduced emissions by 12 million metric 
tons of CO2 (Horowitz, 2001). Incentivizing EE technology to increase dispersion and 
implementation works. LRP respondents clearly find value in utility offered incentives. 
This is shown with 87 percent finding rebate somewhat important, very important, or 
would not have completed the project without it. Finding value in EE programs is echoed 
by 96 percent of LRP respondents stating these programs are beneficial.  
 
Synthesizing the prior points and integrating them into policy is important. Too often 
policy makers, DSM program facilitators, and EE advocates focus on their own 
objectives, without taking into consideration what their constituents, customers, and 
target audience value. By doing so, they overlook a key stakeholder in this process: the 
program participants. Policies are most effective when designed from the consumer’s 
perspective (Stern, 1999). By understanding what potential EE program participants’ 
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value, EE programs can be tailored to increase implementation, participation, and reduce 
overspending on programs that are underutilized.  
 
Minnesota’s EERS regulations and incentives create a mutually beneficial relationship 
between State government, utilities, and electric customers. Within these relationships 
EISA has become a factor. State government regulates and incentivizes utilities EE, but 
EISA now influences both aspects. Utilities incentivize customers to participate in EE 
programs, but those incentives are now based on EISA regulations. In the “post-EISA” 
era, the LRP study provides unique insight to the dynamics of regulations and incentives 
and how they influence EE program participation. Data from this survey reinforces the 
need for both incentives and regulations. Focusing on proper type of incentives and 
appropriate mix of incentives partnered with regulatory policy.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
After reviewing three Federal lighting policies and the LRP, it is clear the most 
successful EE policies involve both the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. Regulations provide 
minimum efficiency requirements for technology, but offer little inspiration. Incentives 
may be key in creating EE innovation. Initially, it would be easy to view EISA as 
infringing on utility’s ability to incentivize DSM participants and creating barriers in 
meeting state mandated EERS, but that would only tell half the story. EISA should be 
credited for innovating lighting policy. Through EISA and incentives, the L Prize 
revolutionized the lighting industry and LEDs. The LRP survey reviews the effects of 
EISA on DSM programs. One year after significant DOE and EISA regulations went into 
effect, the LRP survey shows most participants are supportive of EE regulations and 
rebate incentives are a key motivator in implementing EE lighting. Understanding 
participant perceptions and barriers to EE programs is one way to improve policy design. 
 
Innovation and implementation is needed to advance energy savings. Regulation and 
incentives are the policy levers to provide them. Therefore, policies that create a 
partnership between regulations and incentives provide the most effective energy savings.  
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To encourage technology improvements or when innovation appears stymied, policy 
makers should consider pairing regulation with incentives. In the same vein, if 
regulations can spur consumer adoption of new EE technology, then regulatory policy 
alone may be able to advance EE. But typically new EE technology is more expensive 
than the existing option. In order to counterbalance the incremental cost and increase the 
rate of dispersion, policies that offer incentives for EE technology is needed. 
 
Too often regulations and incentives get a bad rap, one being too heavy-handed, and the 
other too free-handed. As shown through the LRP survey, EISA, and the L Prize, 
regulatory policy can remove uncertainty and foster EE innovation and implementation 
through the correct use of incentives. Policy makers should take these successful results 
into consideration when formulating future energy policy. The carrot and stick are better 
together, working hand-in-hand to achieve optimal energy saving outcomes. 
  
Regulation + Incentives = Innovation 
Regulation + Incentives = Implementation 
Innovation + Implementation = Energy Savings 
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Small Business Lighting Program 
Post-Installation Questionnaire 
 
ID #:   Contact Name:   Phone:   
 
Company Name:    
 
Address:   
 
Date Work Completed:   
 
 
1 – Would you have preferred 0% financing over a rebate to change your lights? 
     Yes     No     Not sure 
 
Respondents: 298 Yes: 15 No: 239 Not Sure: 44 
 
 
2 – If no rebate had been available, would you have changed to new lighting?   
 Yes      No    Not sure 
If yes, why?           
            
 
Respondents: 300 Yes: 99  No: 121 Not Sure: 80 
 
 
3 – Did you have/use T12s in your previous lighting?   
     Yes     No     Not sure 
 
Respondents: 301 Yes: 99  No: 154 Not Sure: 48 
 
 
4 – How much of a factor did the rebate make in proceeding with the lighting project? 
 
 Did not factor into decision  
 Nice but not necessary  
 Somewhat important   
 Very important, factored into decision   
 Would not have completed project without it 
 
Respondents: 301    
Did not factor into decision: 7    
Nice but not necessary: 32       
Somewhat important: 60 
Very important, factored into decision: 128    
Would not have completed project without it: 74 
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5 – Do you think energy efficiency programs are beneficial?      
     Yes     No     Not sure 
 
Respondents: 295 Yes: 284  No: 3  Not Sure: 8 
 
 
6 – Were you aware of energy regulations making certain lights obsolete or no longer 
manufactured? 
 Yes   No  
Comments:          
            
Respondents: 299 Yes: 221  No: 78  
 
 
7 – If you were aware of regulations, how much did this impact your decision to change 
your lights? 
 
 Not at all  
 Slight impact 
 Some impact 
 Large impact 
 Sole reason for changing lights 
 
Respondents: 250   
Not at all: 87  
Slight impact: 53 
Some impact: 54  
Large impact: 48   
Sole reason for changing lights: 8 
 
 
8 – Do you think lighting energy efficiency standards and regulations are beneficial? 
     Yes     No     Not sure 
Other (please specify):        
            
Respondents: 300 Yes: 222  No: 27  Not Sure: 51 
 
 
9 – Any additional thoughts or comments on the lighting program? 
 
Comments:          
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